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Can the State Learn to Live Well? Álvaro García Linera as an Intellectual of the State and 
Interpreter of History 
 
Abstract: The rise of Morales and his Movement to Socialism in Bolivia in 2006 forms part of a 
general left-turn in Latin America in which, in the Andes in particular, the resurgence of political 
claims based on the right to indigeneity in the public national sphere has been an important 
element. As I argue, the political project of ‘refounding’ the State that the Morales administration 
has carried out, culminating in a change of constitution in 2009, has adopted an internal tension 
between national-popular and popular-indigenous elements. This article analyses the way in 
which the current Vice-President of Bolivia and public intellectual Álvaro García Linera deals 
with this tension in his writings on the State. The argument will explore how his writing fails to 
escape a certain logic which reproduces a classical model of sovereignty, in which it becomes 
García Linera’s role as an intellectual of the State to interpret Bolivian history and develop 
political proposals with this historical interpretation at its base.  
Keywords: García Linera, Bolivia, Buen Vivir, multinational State 
 
Someone, you or me, comes forward and says: I would like to learn how 
to live finally. 
The Specters of Marx, Jacques Derrida (1994 xvi, author’s emphasis)1 
                                                     
1
 The original quote in French reads: “J’aimerais apprendre à vivre en fin”. The verb apprendre contains an 
intentional ambiguity, whose usual meaning is to learn, but can also mean to teach. Derrida questions thus not only 
what it would mean to learn to live, but also what it would mean to claim to be able to teach another how to live or, 
even, on what grounds one could make the claim that the other has not yet truly learnt how to live.  
  
 With this enigmatic syntagma, Jacques Derrida opened a lecture on the legacy of Karl 
Marx and The Communist Manifesto that was given in two parts on April 22
nd
 and 23
rd
 of 1993 at 
the University of Riverside, California. It would later be revised and published under the title 
The Specters of Marx. The question of life is placed at the centre of what it means to reconsider 
the legacy of Marx after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of ‘real socialism,’ a question of 
life as that which exceeds every calculative-representative logic, of life as being for death, as a 
living with, but above all of a life whose spectres render it not a merely present life, but the 
promise of a future life that can (yet) be otherwise. It is also thus the question of a spectre, the 
spectre of Marx and of Marxism, whose presence is still felt, indeed, who still unexpectedly pays 
us visit, even after Marxism has, finally, been defeated, and the triumph of global liberal 
capitalism is celebrated. The question of learning to live is then, for Derrida, about a certain 
Marxism that is still to come, or perhaps still to return. The ‘finally’ of ‘I would like to learn how 
to live, finally’ would be the return of a Marxist horizon still capable of putting a spanner in the 
works of a capitalist machine whose progress appears ineluctable.   
 It is perhaps worth wondering if, having known the present case of Bolivia, Derrida 
would not have reformulated his refrain in the following manner: ‘I would like to learn how to 
live well, finally.’ The concept of the Buen Vivir [living well or good life] forms part of a 
philosophical vision which has gained a great deal of political currency in recent years in the 
Andes region. It was incorporated into the new Ecuadorian constitution in 2008 and the new 
Bolivian constitution in 2009, and is widely discussed in academic and popular media circles in 
both countries. This is partly a result of a certain claim by which the Buen Vivir becomes the 
bearer of a number of cosmovisions whose roots are identified with indigenous-communitarian 
forms of living and is, therefore, strongly associated with the so-called ‘emergent indigeneity’ 
  
that has been taking place in Andean politics over the last few decades. Emergent indigeneity can 
be defined in an approximate manner as the increased visibility of political claims based on the 
right to being indigenous – however this is defined – in the national public sphere.2 It represents 
the return of a spectre proper to the (post-)colonial history of the Latin American continent – that 
of the originary peoples themselves – but coincides with the return of another spectre, of a 
tradition of the Latin American left whose last bulwark, in Cuba, had already lost appeal in 
intellectual terms by the time of the Sandinistas’ electoral defeat in Nicaragua in 1991. Are we 
today – finally - witnessing the emergence of a new left-wing alternative on the continent, and 
the recognition of indigenous populations that have been excluded from political processes for 
the past five centuries?  
 Bolivia is one of the Latin American countries in which this left-turn or so-called ‘pink 
tide’ appears to have had remarkable success in establishing long-lasting government reforms 
that are widely regarded as legitimate, as is reflected by the continued popularity of the current 
MAS (Movement to Socialism) government, and the relative social stability of recent years. 
Following the unprecedented electoral victory of President Evo Morales and his ‘co-pilot’ Vice-
President Álvaro García Linera in 2006, the project of the MAS government has been no less 
than the ‘refoundation’ of the State. This has included Constitutional reforms that were finally 
passed in 2009, making Bolivia officially the ‘Plurinational State of Bolivia.’ It is a project 
which is clearly understood in left-wing terms, as a challenge to the neoliberal administrations 
that came before it and often operates on a national-popular register. At the same time, this 
project of refoundation can also be regarded as a response to the popular-indigenous claims 
which eventually led, following a series of revolutionary insurrections between 2000 and 2005, 
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 Refer to Marisol de la Cadena, 2010, for a more precise discussion.  
  
to the election of Morales himself. As we will observe in more detail below, then, the discourse 
of the MAS, in so far as it concerns a new State project, adopts an internal tension. This tension 
adopts the form of a double bind or double obligation which has conditioned the narrative 
surrounding the so-called process of change (proceso de cambio) in Bolivia. It is a double 
obligation because it is caught between two demands that are mutually exclusive of one another. 
On the one hand, the project of the MAS seeks to construct a new broad-base national-popular 
hegemony. On the other hand, however, this construction seeks to be faithful to a revolutionary 
moment which had been conceived as a war between different civilizationary models or nations: 
the communitarian indigenous and the capitalist criollo-mestizo nation.   
Our interest here is to analyse how García Linera, as intellectual and interpreter of the 
recent historical events in Bolivia, responds to and before this double bind in his writings on the 
state. In particular, attention will be given to two texts written just before he adopts the position 
of Vice-President of Bolivia (they are both originally published in 2004): ‘Indigenous 
Autonomies and Multinational State’ (2008a) and ‘State Crisis and Indigenous-Plebeian Mutiny 
in Bolivia’ (2008b).3 What I would like to draw attention to is the way in which this political 
figure, by positioning himself in a very particular way through his writing as an intellectual, 
observer, interpreter and politician – that is, as a member of the urban lettered elite – is capable 
of endowing himself with an exceptional place of legitimacy from which he becomes able to 
interpret Bolivian history and, with this interpretation as his starting point, intervene in it 
politically. It should be clear that this exceptional sphere of intellectuality also implies a question 
of political sovereignty. To this extent, the project of the new State in García Linera’s theoretical 
model – arguably a variation on the current model of the MAS government – does not 
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 All translations, unless stated otherwise in the bibliography, are the author’s own.  
  
sufficiently engage with the problem of State sovereignty, even if it supposes to redistribute the 
power structure of State decision-making procedures among popular-indigenous sectors. On the 
contrary, rather than dividing or suspending it, this sovereignty is simply re-articulated under a 
new structure. The State becomes therefore the transcendent principle which is able to redirect 
the destiny of the nation in accordance with a new sense of historical normativity, which it 
becomes the task of the intellectual to prescribe.   
Bolivia: One State, Two Nations 
 The above mention of the Buen Vivir in the Bolivian public sphere is not merely 
anecdotal or rhetorical, but it also presents us with a central tension which has defined the 
Bolivian political process in the 21
st
 Century. As Víctor Bretón Solo de Zaldívar (2013) has 
indicated, even if the concept of ‘living well’ or a ‘good life’ draws explicitly on an Aristotelian 
tradition of philosophy, it nevertheless represents a formally critical discursive construction 
which challenges neoclassical economic theory and conventional developmentalism (80). What 
is key here is that, even if this same author suggests that the concept of the Buen Vivir is ‘firmly 
set upon a western episteme’ (ibid, author’s emphasis), it claims to open up to an ‘intercultural 
dialogue of knowledges’ (ibid) by incorporating a number of supposedly indigenous 
cosmovisions. Eduardo Gudynas and Alberto Acosta (2011) have analysed the Buen Vivir in 
terms of a catch-all concept, which is capable of articulating an alternative notion of life which 
turns upon a multiplicity of indigenous cosmovisions, such as a specifically Andean structure of 
economy based on reciprocity and Guarani mythology. In their own words: ‘el Buen Vivir, from 
its plurality, represents explorations which go beyond the ideas of development proper to 
Modernity’ (81). The concept has been given particular political weight in Bolivia by David 
  
Choquehuanca, foreign minister since 2006, who opposes the Vivir Bien or ‘living well’ to the 
capitalist strive for constant progress, what he calls Vivir Mejor (‘living better’).4  
The Buen Vivir also presents, therefore, a dualistic vision of society, by putting forward 
that Bolivia is neither one nor many, but two - one indigenous-communitarian, the other mestizo-
white-capitalist. In this sense, the notion of Buen Vivir can be firmly placed in a certain tradition 
in which the division of Bolivian history into two parts would represent a way of reinscribing 
‘indigenous difference’ within the historical narrative of the nation’s devenir. This 
reconsideration of traditional Bolivian historiography is what has been called the reinvention of 
the Indian, a phenomenon which has been on the rise since the late 1960s in Bolivia, promoted 
by the discourse of katarismo, a political group which sought to reclaim the word ‘Indian’ from 
its pejorative roots. It was Fausto Reinaga, author of The Indian Revolution in 1969, and creator 
of the very term Indianism, who first put forward the notion that there were two Bolivian nations 
existing contemporaneously within the same time and space. According to this author, these two 
faces of Bolivian history were irreconcilable, and the only possible road to salvation for the 
Indian could be found in the Indian Revolution, the complete replacement of the white-mestizo 
order for an Indian civilisation. Indeed, as a certain current of katarismo advocated, this dualistic 
vision of history made it possible to see Bolivia ‘with both eyes,’ that is, not only from the 
ethnocentric monocular tradition of an orthodox Marxism which was the main object of criticism 
for the early kataristas.
5
 It implied a new way of seeing, a rupture which made visible what was 
previous invisible, revealing what had previously been veiled. To use the political-aesthetic 
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 See, for example, the press release by the Bolivian Foreign Relations Ministry in Spain regarding a conference that 
Choquehuanca gave on the topic in April of 2013 (‘El vivir bien como filosofía del proceso de cambio,’ 2013). 
5
 For a more detailed account of this version of katarismo which explores the possible aesthetic readings of the 
notion of ‘seeing with both eyes’, refer to Javier Sanjinés (2004).  
  
terminology of philosopher Jacques Rancière, it represented a re-distribution of the sensible at 
the heart of the Bolivian political tradition.
6
  
 This new mode of reading Bolivian history turned on a double historical horizon. On the 
one hand, it presented a new interpretation of the past from the perspective of the exclusion of 
the indigenous from Bolivia’s Republican tradition. As Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui claims (1987), 
this historical ‘recuperation’ adopted two horizons of indigenous memory – a distant memory of 
the colonial experience which continued to determine the exclusion of indigenous life from 
Bolivian politics, and a recent memory of the promises and failures of the 1952 Revolution, and 
particularly of how indigenous difference came to be erased after the Revolution by a fraternal 
Marxist language of the revolutionary State, which replaced the term ‘Indian’ with ‘peasant.’ On 
the other hand, this new discourse also constituted its historical subject – the Indian – as a 
projection or trajectory, on the path towards a messianic future, an emancipatory horizon for the 
indigenous peoples. 
 This is the legacy of indigenous-popular civil movements which was inherited by the 
Morales government in 2006. The unprecedented electoral majority that brought Morales to 
power made him the third President of Bolivia in three years, following the resignation of two 
neoliberal Presidents during a serious of indigenous-popular uprisings. His election to some 
extent represented therefore the promise of indigenous emancipation, in the sense understood by 
Indianist discourse above. At the same time, however, the elections were regarded by many 
others in Bolivia as the promise to restore order without needing to resort to force after more 
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 With the ‘distribution of the sensible,’ Jacques Rancière means to designate the economy of any aesthetic regime. 
It should be understood that, for Rancière, the aesthetic is not merely a question of art but of how perception and the 
production of meaning co-determine one another, defining what is and what is not visible within a given common 
space. For more details, refer to Rancière (2006). 
  
than five years of revolutionary insurrection. In other words, for these sectors of society, it was a 
question of how to restore some level of national unity.  
 The complexity of this double register, oscillating between the national-popular and 
popular-indigenous, could be felt in the double inauguration of Evo Morales in January of 2006. 
The first inauguration took place January 21
st
 in Tiwanaku, a pre-Incan site, as part of a popular 
ceremony in which Morales walked over coca leaves (considered sacred in many Andean 
indigenous cultures), was blessed by Andean religious leaders and recognised as Apumallku, 
indigenous leader. The second inauguration, the official State inauguration, took place the 
following day in La Paz, where the new President announced a cultural democratic revolution, 
conjuring the popular images of struggles by national idols as diverse as Tupac Katari, Simón 
Bolívar and Che Guevara, after five hundred years of resistance from indigenous, black and 
popular sectors (Postero 2007, 18). In these two events, Morales articulates a historical 
conscience of injustice from a register which clearly pertains to the Indianist tradition which we 
have outlined here. Nevertheless, he does not fail to maintain a national-popular discourse, in 
which the downtrodden classes of Bolivian history are understood to be popular sectors in a 
general sense, not only those which have descended from indigenous communities. One cannot 
help but think of Morales’s double inauguration, then, as his ascendency to Presidency in not 
one, but two nations - the two Bolivias. It is symbolic of a unification of two nations inhabiting 
the same geopolitical area which have been irreconcilably divided since the Conquest – at least, 
according to certain Indianist claims. In Morales’s double inauguration, what is perceived is a 
negotiation at the intersection of a number of political and popular discourses, between the 
national-popular and the popular-indigenous, which intervene and interconnect on a new political 
plane. 
  
 The demand for a deepening of democratic structures in Bolivia adopted in the election of 
Morales therefore an aporetic structure. On the one hand, the new government administration 
had a clear national and conciliatory-nationalist horizon. On the other hand, it continued – at 
least rhetorically – to be faithful to the revolutionary movement which brought it to power, 
envisaged as the long-awaited victory of a communitarian-indigenous bloc over their white-
mestizo-capitalist oppressors. Many observers within the country have remarked such a tension. 
Pablo Stefanoni (2011) spoke of the problematic of ‘two illusions’ competing simultaneously in 
the country, one ‘developmentalist’ and the other ‘communitarian.’ Maristella Svampa (2009) 
noted that ‘the ideology of Evo Morales articulates a double dimension’ (59), in which, ‘we have 
the case of an intertwining between a communitarian project, still in process, conceived of as a 
project and a horizon, and of a national-popular path, as a means of conceiving and doing 
politics, with all of its regulating, centralist and verticalist dimensions’ (60). 
 The discourse of the MAS thus finds itself caught in a kind of double bind or double 
obligation. On the one hand, their discourse responds to a demand to bring to an end the unjust 
oppression of the subaltern sectors of society, those who have been marginalised from and by 
history (in which the indigenous have a privileged, but not exclusive place). This demand adopts 
a universal character in the name of a - necessarily incalculable – justice. On the other hand, 
however, this demand has, as its condition of possibility, the particularities which meet at the 
intersection of the conflicting narratives of the two Bolivias – on the one hand, a national-
popular legacy which remits to the revolutionary project of ’52, and, on the other, the emergence 
of an Indianism which rejects the latter for its exclusion of the indigenous question. This second 
‘Bolivia’ would, of course, include all the particularities of indigeneity as it is conceived in and 
by these Indianist discourses, with its indigenous histories, politics, cultures, ethnicities and ways 
  
of life. The project of the Morales government, then, could be understood as an attempt to create 
a State structure that was capable of providing relief to the tension of this double obligation. 
 
Can the State learn to live well?  
 If we have taken an extended contextual detour in order to indicate the conditions of a 
double bind or double obligation at the heart of the MAS’s State project, it is because this 
problematic is not alien to the author that concerns us here. It is well known that the current 
Vice-President of Bolivia participated in the Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK) throughout 
the late 80s and early 90s, founded by Aymara nationalist Felipe Quispe, an activist who was 
heavily engaged with the Indianist revival and with the writings of Fausto Reinaga in particular. 
It is perhaps not surprising that García Linera’s seminal work, Value Form, Community Form 
(1995), written while he was in a maximum security prison for his involvement with the 
Guerrilla movement, is clearly influenced by his experience with Aymara resistance, as a work in 
which he proposes the universalisation of the ayllu (an indigenous form of community) as a 
political horizon capable of replacing mercantile capitalist societal forms. After being released 
without trial in the late 90s, and with other members of the so-called Comune intellectual group, 
García Linera became a kind of Marxist chronicler and interpreter of the Bolivian Zeitgeist, co-
writing volumes on indigenous and popular social movements at the moment of most intense 
social dissidence within Bolivia. He is very familiar with the debates that have formed and 
shaped Indianist discourse, and explicitly recognises his own work as part of a resurgence of a 
critical Marxism at the turn of the century in Bolivia, which found itself in the interstices of 
debates on Marxism and Indianism (see García Linera 2008d). Indeed, García Linera’s own 
Marxist thought can be interpreted as an attempt to provide a Marxist account of Indianism, or a 
  
language that is compatible with both of these traditions. Both an established academic and 
respected activist, his position within the Bolivian lettered elite would appear to give him 
particular legitimacy as an interpreter and spokesperson of the downtrodden classes. 
García Linera’s essay, ‘Indigenous Autonomy and Multinational State’, published 
originally in 2004,
7
 and thus only two years before he would eventually adopt the position of 
Vice-President of Bolivia, draws on his previous work on popular-indigenous movements in 
order to propose a possible reconfiguration of the Bolivian State. It is interesting to note that the 
author rejects in this essay not only, predictably, the neoliberal State model, but also, perhaps 
more surprising, a State model based on indigenous national autonomy projects such as those 
being carried out by certain Aymara groups during the years that he was writing. Given his 
vociferous sympathy for Indianist liberation projects, one might imagine that García Linera 
would have been likely to consider this second possibility more seriously. Instead, he proposes 
the designing of a new State structure which would be capable of allocating the distribution of 
powers and normativity appropriate to the ‘ethnic-cultural diversity’ and the ‘civilisational 
plurality’ of Bolivia. What he is writing about here is a State project which would be accountable 
to the plurality of the indigenous-popular sectors within Bolivia that were mobilising at that time 
around questions of increased autonomy and State recognition without, for all that, renouncing to 
the possibility of a national-popular base that extends beyond those same sectors. In other words, 
this author places this new State project very explicitly within the double bind outlined above. 
His proposal for a new State structure can be read, indeed, as an attempt to unravel the double-
bind at the heart of the Bolivian revolutionary project, oscillating between the national-popular 
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 See La descentralización que viene. ed. Álvaro García Linera et al. La Paz: ILDiS-Plural (2004). 
  
and the popular-indigenous. His proposal also coincides with what will be the eventual project of 
the MAS government itself. 
At a very basic level, his proposal is for the design of a new State structure which adopts 
what we might call a more organic integration with the motely character of Bolivian society - that 
is, the simultaneous existence of different social, economic and political forms under one nation.
8
 
It is a proposal which departs from a very precise critique of the neoliberal patrimonial State 
apparatus in place at the time of his writing. The kernel of this critique resides in his accusation 
that the current neoliberal State, by not being sufficiently organically integrated with Bolivia’s 
motely society, is only able to preside over that society as an overdetermination of its diverse 
social forms, and therefore as a form of domination. On the one hand, he claims, the State 
refuses to recognise alternative cultural forms that exist within the country as legitimate political 
articulations at the national level. In other words, despite that Bolivia itself is a ‘co-existence of 
various overlapping or moderately articulated regional nationalities or cultures’ (225), the State 
is nevertheless ‘monolingual and monocultural in terms of Bolivian Spanish-speaking cultural 
identity’ (226). On the other hand, García Linera accuses the state of privileging the dominant 
capitalist form of civilisation over all others, making the claim that Bolivia is 
‘multicivilisational.’ With the term ‘multicivilisational’, García Linera draws upon the work of 
one of the other members of the former intellectual group Comune, Luis Tapia, who uses the 
term civilisation to refer to the different modes of production that exist simultaneously within 
contemporary Bolivia (Tapia 2002). Thus, writes García Linera, while two-thirds of the Bolivian 
economy is not of a modern mercantile-industrial type, but rather follows a guild, corporative, 
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 Motely is the most common translation of Marxist sociologist René Zavaleta Mercado’s theorisation of Bolivian 
social structure as a sociedad abigarrada. Refer to Zavaleta Mercado (1986). The expression has been adopted by 
members of the Comune group, in which García Linera once participated to navigate the problematic blurring of 
class and ethnic lines in Bolivian historical accounts. As such, it has become for García Linera an important 
theoretical tool for managing the double bind between Bolivia’s “two nations.”  
  
collective or what is called simply ‘Amazonian’ logic (2008a, 232 - 235), the State constitutes 
itself exclusively on the basis of this first type of economy. In other words, while the neoliberal 
State logic follows political habits and techniques appropriate to a certain kind of civilisational 
order (that of mercantile capitalism), this is not so for most of those who inhabit the national 
territory, thereby excluding them de facto from national participatory politics. 
  García Linera thus proposes a new State structure which is both multinational and 
multicivilisational, that is, one which is able to account for the two dimensions of Bolivian 
political life that are not recognised as such by the current neoliberal State. In speaking of the 
first dimension, the multinational State, what is really at stake for García Linera is challenging a 
notion of citizenship based on supposedly universal grounds, given that this would always 
already be founded, he affirms, on a necessarily ethnocentric perspective (247). This claim turns 
on a reduction of the political demos to the etnos that sustains it, wherein, in each and every case, 
every demos is always already an etnos and, therefore, the promotion of a universal citizenship 
(‘demos’) is nothing other than the reproduction of the ethnocentric monocultural State that the 
author seeks to criticise. What would be necessary, instead, would be to ‘take on processes of 
asymmetrical and differentiated recognition of national and ethnic identities on a macro and 
regional scale’ (249), in which one could achieve ‘political unity of a differential society, that is 
to say, one that has communities that are national and others that are not’ (ibid). This would 
include granting a certain level of autonomy to those national or ethnic communities he 
mentions, on the one hand, while also fostering the possibility that these communities are 
represented in the State apparatus itself, on the other.  
The kernel of the second dimension, which García Linera calls the multicivilisational 
State, resides in the understanding that there are many forms of democratic practices which 
  
currently operate in Bolivian society and which have a direct relationship with the diverse types 
of economic systems that exist, or to use a language which reflects more closely that of the 
author, which conform to the political habits and techniques of their objective mode of 
production. The author develops here upon critical reflections which represent some of the 
strongest contributions of his work, understanding modes of political participation as co-
determinants of the conditions of production which lie at their base. García Linera thus accuses 
the State form that Bolivia has historically known of undermining the political practices of 
subaltern groups in favour of a representational liberal democracy that privileges only those 
members of society who conform to the logic of the mercantile economy. The task of the 
multicivilisational State, therefore, would be to account for these alternative practices by 
granting them a legitimate decision-making capacity in the drafting of public policies which have 
an impact in the national arena. In his own words: 
Due to the qualities of its historical formation, the complex social reality 
of Bolivia has produced various techniques of political democratic 
behaviour, and an effective democratic State would be required to 
recognise on a large scale, in the sphere of fundamental decision making 
of public policies, the institutionalised legitimacy of the different ways 
of practicing and understanding democracy (265).  
García Linera’s writings on the multinational and multicivilisational State represented an 
important contribution to ongoing reflections on the topic from a marginalised group of political 
activists and writers who were daring enough to imagine Bolivia otherwise during a moment of 
great political conservatism. He represents an intellectual who worked within the horizon of an 
indigenous-popular movement while nevertheless refusing to privilege the particularities of that 
  
movement over other social forms that co-habited the nation. Indeed, by articulating the 
possibility of a unified state apparatus which is multinational and multicivilizational, what 
García Linera offers is a way of bridging the two incompatible registers of the popular demands 
which lay behind the election of the MAS government in 2006. The indigenous claims to 
national autonomy are no longer incompatible with a national-popular discourse, in which the 
“socialism to come” and “Andean and Amazonian capitalism,” important articulations of the 
MAS project which have come from García Linera since 2006, is presided over by the single 
“pluri” nation-state.  
However, there is a tension here between the projection of Bolivia as a multinational 
State, and the role of the single state apparatus that comes to preside over these multiple nations. 
By placing himself in the role of chronicler and interpreter of the Bolivian Zeitgeist, in which he 
is capable of explaining the insurrectionary moment of 2000 – 2005 through recourse to a certain 
way of understanding Bolivia in all its civilisational plurality or motley sociality, García Linera 
offers himself in this essay as the intellectual figure able to prescribe modifications or 
‘corrections’9 to the State apparatus, an apparatus which would eventually be capable therefore 
of ‘representing’ the structure of that plurality. What I want to draw attention to here is not the 
question of whether or not García Linera’s diagnosis of Bolivia’s motley society can promote a 
better understanding of how certain forms of exploitation have historically taken place in that 
country, but rather how the author reproduces a certain relationship between knowledge 
production and the subaltern in his writings in which it is the role of the intellectual to translate 
the needs of the underrepresented. As such, it is the intellectual who retains the right to speak for 
the motley character of the multination, to know better, to teach how to live well, thereby 
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 I use ‘correction’ throughout this article as a translation of ‘reconducción’, the word that the Morales 
administration adopted to make reference to the constitutional reforms.   
  
conjuring the ghostly echo of a sovereign voice thought to have been exorcised from the body 
politic. García Linera positions himself through his writing as a figure of authority, as the one 
capable of consolidating the multiple histories of an indigenous-popular Bolivia into a single 
project, writing the (multi-)nation as a new imagined community. He places himself in a 
privileged position for reconciling the double bind at the heart of the Bolivian revolutionary 
moment. 
Meanwhile, the question of sovereignty in the multinational State is never truly addressed 
in the text. Although the author explicitly advocates a State apparatus of a multi-demotic 
composition (against a ‘universal citizenship,’ as described above), the question of who or what 
holds the final decisions regarding the transformation of the State in the building of so-called 
indigenous-popular hegemony is suspended in his writing, postponed for another moment. What 
is nevertheless detectable in the writings of those years is a certain hesitation between a 
theorisation of the multiplicity of social forms based on historically contingent objective 
conditions, and a certain sense of historical normativity which would indicate the necessary 
direction of a new political practice. In another essay on the state published in the same year,
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‘State Crisis and Indigenous-Plebeian Mutiny in Bolivia’ (2008b), for example, the author 
suggests that the State crisis of those revolutionary years did not bring into question the notion of 
progress or development per se, but was rather a consequence of bad progress or bad 
development, which would appear to reinstate a certain investment in developmentalism and 
modernity. He affirms: ‘the generalised institutionality of indigenous and plebeian social 
movements…question the validity of a Republican state institutionality that feigns modernity in 
a society that lacks, and is still deprived, of the structural and material bases of this imagined 
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modernity’ (340, my emphasis). Particularly revealing in this text is that, for the author, the State 
crisis that was taking place at the time of his writing was not to be understood as a possible 
opening to alternative forms of governance that quite simply refused the State as a legitimate 
political body, but rather to a – necessary – reformulation and re-stabilisation of the State. In his 
own words: ‘With all this, it is well known that state crises cannot last long because there is no 
society that can withstand long periods of incertitude and emptiness of political articulation’ 
(343). With the inevitability of the state structure, then, the author is forced to conclude that, ‘the 
indigenous-plebeian pole should consolidate a hegemonic capacity… understanding this as 
intellectual and moral leadership over the social majorities of the country’ (349, my emphasis). 
The question here is not whether the state form should or should not be the platform for 
any meaningful process of revolutionary change in Bolivia today. It is rather about a certain 
question concerning the complicity between politics and the role of public intellectuals, which no 
single person in Latin America today, perhaps, better represents than García Linera. By speaking 
on behalf of what the indigenous-plebeian should do in their capacity of intellectual and moral 
leadership, what is at stake is a new ethical-normative principle which sovereignly declares itself 
above the social majority. It is exceptional, in so far as it extracts or immunizes itself from the 
process of history in order to direct and ‘correct’ it, in the name of a historical justice which 
transcends the conditions of any localised conflict. What is more, by speaking on behalf of this 
process, as the interpreter of the motely Bolivian social body par excellence, it is the state and its 
intellectual elite (of which García Linera comes to represent the highest but not only 
representative) that legitimates itself to represent that intellectual and moral leadership. The 
question would no longer be, then, of whether the state can ‘learn to live well, finally’ but, 
having already learnt its lessons from history, whether it can ‘teach to live well, finally’ – and 
  
what happens to those students who never seem to learn. From this perspective, the multinational 
or multicivilisational State model in García Linera’s writing does not seek to divide or suspend 
the political sovereignty of the State (by granting, for example, autonomous decision-making 
power of indigenous communities over the use of land), but rather to reinstate this sovereignty 
under a new guise.  
Conclusion: Point of Bifurcation 
Writing in 2008, amidst difficult negotiations concerning the Bolivian constitutional 
reforms, García Linera’s text ‘State in Transition. Power Bloc and Point of Bifurcation’ (2008c) 
was published in an unfinished form. Continuing to emphasise the inevitability of the State form, 
the author characterizes the history of the State as a repeated cycle of crisis and reconstitution. In 
this essay, García Linera argues that the current Bolivian State should be considered a ‘State in 
Transition’, one that, having lived through a moment of crisis during the insurrections of 2000 – 
2005, finds itself in a moment of reconstitution that has not yet been consolidated. Taking place 
in a moment that constitutes a radical transformation of class conditions for the author, what is 
indeed certain is that the process of transition has brought about new blocs of power which are 
changing the configuration of the State itself. Nevertheless, and despite this, ‘the battle for the 
lasting ideological direction of society is not resolved’ (409). What the State is still waiting to 
experience is its ‘point of bifurcation,’ understood as a ‘point of conversion from the disorder of 
the system into the order and stabilisation of that same system’ (410). It is a moment in which 
this new order, the new power bloc, comes to a head with other potentially hegemonic blocs and 
there is a closure of the open-ended process that the State crisis represents. García Linera finishes 
with this premonitory passage: 
  
Initially we had believed that the construction of the State was possible 
through mechanisms of dialogue and pacts and, actually, we still believe 
in and support this option, the idea of reaching a point of bifurcation of a 
democratic character, by successive approximations. But the logics of 
reason and history make us think, rather, that increasingly we will 
eventually reach something more like a moment of a tensioning of 
forces, the point of bifurcation, and we will have to see what happens. I 
think that in the case of Bolivia, this moment is closer than it seems. But 
in any case, the point of bifurcation and its qualities are going to define 
the personality and the qualities of the new State in the future (412).  
 The essay was published in its final form two years later, in which García Linera 
supplements the text with a certain ‘working hypothesis.’ According to the author, in the months 
of August to October of 2008, Bolivia would have experienced its point of bifurcation, the events 
that would bring an end the moment of State transition, consolidating ‘the new structure of State 
correlation of forces, which were furthermore made visible in the general election results of 
December 2009’ (2010, 35). He is writing of a moment which was decisive for the passing of the 
Constitutional Reforms, when the more right-leaning so-called ‘half-moon’ region in the east of 
Bolivia lost the upper hand in its attempt to stall and limit the MAS’s constitutional proposals 
(not without first, however, forcing the Morales administration to accept important 
modifications) and the Constitution was finally passed. The full details of the moment are not 
important here, what is more critical is the way in which this moment is explicitly celebrated in 
the text as an achievement for the ‘indigenous-popular government’ over the right-wing 
opposition, closing a moment of crisis and opening to a new order which does not belong to the 
  
old elite, but is faithful to alternative nations and ethnicities, historically closing, perhaps, the 
previous irreconcilable conflict between the two Bolivian nations. In the text, the moment 
appears as the inauguration of a new age, one of indigenous-popular hegemony that repairs 
hundreds of years of colonial injustice.  
 One must wonder, however, if what is identified here as a point of bifurcation does not 
mask another point of bifurcation that curtailed the open, one could say, post-hegemonic process 
opened by the State crisis that García Linera describes. I refer here, of course, to the recent 
TIPNIS affair (August – October 2011) in which plans for building a highway through the 
Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory were carried out without prior 
consultation with many of the groups that it most affected. When an alliance of indigenous 
organizations protested by marching on La Paz, as they had done many times in the past under 
neoliberal administrations to make claims from those governments, they were stopped en route 
and brutally repressed by government authorities. The events resulted in the weakening of the 
indigenous-popular social movements and the dissolution of the Comune intellectual group, 
many of whose former members have since been fierce critics of the Morales administration and 
of García Linera in particular as an esteemed intellectual figure within it. 
How are we to interpret this conflict? As García Linera affirms in his writings on the 
point of bifurcation, in the aftermath of State consolidation there continues to be conflict. 
However, that conflict is no longer about ‘structural conflict,’ no longer confrontations over the 
general shape of the country (2010, 39). Was the TIPNIS affair merely one of these post-crisis 
conflicts? Or should it rather be understood as the ‘real’ point of bifurcation that closed the 
process of State crisis – and, in this version of events, not in the favour of an indigenous-popular 
hegemony? In fact, either viewpoint – one belonging to an uncritical government mass, another 
  
belonging to an equally uncritical, perhaps, mass of resistance – is always already ideological 
from the standpoint of history. Adopting either perspective would be to reiterate the exceptional 
figure that the State represents in the re-writing of history that is currently being consolidated as 
part and parcel of the new Bolivian social pact (a process that is, I would argue, still being 
negotiated, but has been a great deal more overdetermined by official discourse in recent years). 
The current Vice-President of Bolivia, as intellectual of the State and interpreter of history, has 
written for himself an exceptional role within the new social order. The role of a critical 
intellectual practice should be to continue to bring attention to the ghostly return of a sovereign 
whose exile from the new revolutionary order was always already an internal exile, who was 
never altogether purged or exorcised. And whose return from the dead can still teach us, perhaps, 
new lessons on what it would mean to want to learn to live well.  
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